We study the problem of verifiable polynomial evaluation in the user-server and multi-party setups. We propose INTERPOL, an information-theoretically verifiable algorithm that allows a user to delegate the evaluation of a polynomial to a server, and verify the correctness of the results with high probability and in sublinear complexity. Compared to the existing approaches which typically rely on cryptographic assumptions, INTERPOL stands out in that it does not assume any computational limitation on the server. INTERPOL relies on decomposition of polynomial evaluation into two matrix multiplications, and injection of computation redundancy in the form of locally computed parities with secret coefficients for verification. Furthermore, by generalizing INTERPOL to a multiparty setting consisting of a network of n untrusted nodes, where each node is interested in evaluating the same polynomial, we demonstrate that we can achieve an overall computational complexity comparable to a trusted setup, while guaranteeing information-theoretic verification at each node.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud and edge computing are rapidly growing in popularity by enabling users to simply offload their compute-intensive tasks via the Internet. But, how can we make sure that the computations are done correctly in the cloud? For example, there may be dishonest servers in the cloud that may return plausible (and potentially misleading) results without performing the actual work. This critical problem has motivated the formalization of Verifiable Computation, which is to enable offloading of computations to untrusted servers while maintaining verifiable results (e.g., [1] , [2] ).
More specifically, as depicted in Figure 1 , in the problem of verifiable computing a user is interested in evaluating f (x). After some preprocessing, he will reveal a functionf and an input valuex to the server. The server will be in charge of returning m =f (x). Given a returned valuem, the user must be able to (i) verify that indeedm =f (x), and (ii) recover the value of f (x). He must be able to perform both of these tasks in substantially smaller complexity than the original computation of f (x).
The problem of verifiable computation has a rich history in the literature. A large body of work focuses on computation of arbitrary functions, by relying on Probabilistically Checkable Proofs [3] , Fully Homomorphic Encryption [1] , or converting arithmetic circuits into Quadratic Arithmetic Programs [4] , [5] . Despite their theoretical beauty, many of these works are still far from being practically implementable. As a result, there has been several recent efforts to address the computation ,
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with the help of server. • Verify its correctness. of specific functions which are of popular demand, such as polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication [6] , [7] , [2] . The focus of this line of work is to present algorithms which can be implemented and provide satisfactory performance guarantees, at the expense of generality.
Our main contribution in this paper is the development of a new algorithm, named INTERPOL 1 , for verifiable polynomial computing. The distinguishing feature of INTERPOL is that it does not rely on any cryptographic assumption. As a result, even a computationally unbounded adversarial server, or one equipped with a quantum computer cannot compromise the security of the system. To the best of our knowledge, INTER-POL is the first information-theoretically secure algorithm for verifiable polynomial computation.
To accomplish this, we first transform the problem of polynomial evaluation to two matrix multiplications, the first performed by the server and the second by the user. The complexity of the first matrix multiplication is linear in k, where k is the degree of the polynomial that needs to be evaluated. Hence, the complexity of the server remains the same as that of a polynomial computation. On the other hand, the complexity of the second matrix multiplication, which is done by the user, is only O( √ k). Furthermore, we provide a simple mechanism for the user to verify the correctness of the first matrix multiplication by performing several parity checks with secret coefficients. This verification too can be done in O( √ k). As a result, the overall complexity of the user will be O( √ k), which is much smaller than evaluating the polynomial. The security of INTERPOL merely relies on hiding the secret coefficients of the parity checks from the server, and thus cannot be compromised by a computationally unbounded server.
The second feature of INTERPOL is that it is publicly verifiable [8] , in the sense that not only the user, but any other node in the network can perform the verification and decide whether the result of computation is correct. This property allows us to extend our results to a network of n nodes where all the nodes are interested in evaluating the same polynomial at a given input. This setup is indeed very common, for instance in the context of blockchain, where all the full nodes in the network examine a newly mined block to check the validity of the transactions included therein. This process can be formulated as a polynomial evaluation [9] which can be captured by our model. Our approach to this problem is as follows. We require each node to perform a small part of the computation. The nodes then exchange these intermediate results and verify the correctness of the results provided by other nodes in the network. Following this procedure, and assuming that the number of nodes in the network is substantially smaller than the dimensionality of the problem, we can reduce the overall computational complexity of the network by a factor of n, compared to the scenario where each node performs the computation individually.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A user wishes to delegate the computation of a polynomial f (x) of degree k over some finite field F q , at a series of input values x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x max } to a server. We assume that both f and the set {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x max } are known globally. The user must be able to verify, with high probability and in low complexity, the correctness of the result provided by the server. We consider an amortized model [1] where the user can afford to perform a one-time computionally heavy task. A commonly-adapted assumption in the literature is that the number of input values at which we are interested in evaluating f (x) is so large that this initialization cost becomes negligible per round.
Let us represent the overall complexity of the user for one round of computation by C, and let P be the probability of error of the user, i.e., the probability that he would accept a false result as valid. We are interested in characterizing the tradeoff between P and C. In particular, our goal is to achieve a C which is sublinear in the degree of the polynomial, and a probability of error that vanishes as the field size grows large. We will now make these definitions precise.
The initialization phase: The user generates a random variable v and computes (s,f ) = enc ini (f, v). He keeps s private but revealsf to the server.
At round i: The user wishes to recover f (x i ). The computation is done in three steps.
At the end of each round distribution P U . He revealsx i to the server and requests the computation of w =f (x i ). • The server then returns a possibly randomized function
(1)
• The user computes two functions. First, a verification bit b = ver(ŵ, s, f, x i ) is computed. If b = 0, the user rejects the result of the computation. Otherwise, he will aim at recovering the evaluation of f at x by computingr = dec(ŵ, s, f, x i ). He will acceptr = r = f (x i ). The algorithm described above must satisfy the following properties.
• Correctness: If the server is honest, andŵ = w, then the verification process must pass and the user must be able to recover f (x). In other words, for any
(3)
• (Information-Theoretic) Soundness: If the server is dishonest, the verification process must fail with high probability. More formally, suppose at round i the server returnsŵ =f (x) whereŵ could only depend oñ
,f and f . Then, with high probability we must have ver(ŵ, s,f , f,
The term o(1) must vanish as the size of the field q grows large. Note that we are considering a worst case scenario over all possible functions comp(·). This implies that the soundness property must be information-theoretic: it must hold for any server, regardless of his computational budget. • Efficient Verification and Recovery: The entire process of encoding the input, recovering the value of f (x) from w and verifying the result of the computation must be substantially easier than performing the original polynomial evaluation. More formally, define c enc , c ver and c dec as the maximum complexity of computing enc(x, u), ver(w, s, f, x) and dec(w, s, f, x) respectively. This maximum is taken over all polynomials of degree k over F q and all possible set of input values. We must have
• Efficient Computation: Even though we do not assume any limitation on the computation power of the server, we require the complexity of computingf (x) to be comparable to the complexity of computing f (x). More precisely, we require that c' f =Õ(k), whereÕ can hide a polylogarithmic term. Imposing this (or a slightly looser) restriction is crucial in designing practical algorithms. Given the requirements above, we ask what is the tradeoff between the parameters P and C among all possible strategies that achieve cf =Õ(k).
A. Multi-party setup
As a secondary model, we consider a network of n nodes which are all interested in computing f (x) over a series of input values. We assume that f (·) and the set of inputs are publicly known. Furthermore, k n, that is, the dimensionality of the problem is much larger than the number of nodes in the network. In its general form, we can decompose the network into n(n − 1) user-server pairs {( , j), ∈ [n], j ∈ [n], = j}. For each pair ( , j), and at round i, node j will be in charge of computing a specific task w ,j =f ,j (x i, ,j ), and server will verify the correctness of this result with a function ver ,j . Furthermore, node will recover the final result with a function dec applied on all the returned valuesŵ ,j , as well as the output of his initialization phase. For a more formal problem statement, please see [10] .
The algorithm must satisfy the correctness and soundness properties defined similarly to the user-server setup.
• Correctness:
• (Information-Theoretic) Soundness:
,comp(·) P(ver ,j (ŵ ,[n]\{ } , s , f, x i ) = 1|ŵ ,j = w ,j ) and P = max ,j P ,j . In particular, this property must hold regardless of the number of malicious nodes in the network and their state of collusion. For this model, we are interested in characterizing the tradeoff between P and the worst-case complexity of the nodes,
III. MAIN RESULTS
The first contribution of this work is to propose INTER-POL, an algorithm that allows a user to recover the evaluation of a polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + dots + a k−1 x k−1 in complexity O( √ k) with the help of a server. Furthermore, the user can verify the correctness of the computation provided by the server in O(c √ k) for some constant c. Essential to the correctness of INTERPOL is the widely adapted assumption of amortized cost: the user is allowed to perform a one-time heavy computation knowing that this cost will break down over the evaluations of f (x) at x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x max }, and can be neglected [1] . Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm which allows a user to compute a polynomial f (·) of degree k over F q at an input x with the help of a server, which has the following properties. Remark 2. The verification process used in INTERPOL is information-theoretic as opposed to the cryptographic approach that is commonly adapted in the literature. This means that even a computationally unbounded adversarial server will not be able to compromise the security of the system.
Remark 3. INTERPOL is publicly verifiable. This means that not only the user but any other node in the network will be able to verify the correctness of the results, without having to trust the user or the server.
The fact that INTERPOL is publicly verifiable enables us to generalize our results to a multi-party setting as our second contribution. We propose an algorithm that allows every node in a network of n nodes to recover, with high confidence, the result of a polynomial f (x).
Theorem 2. For the multi-party setup in Section II-A, there exists a distributed algorithm which allows each node in a network of n nodes to compute a polynomial f (·) of degree k over F q at an input x, with the following properties. Remark 4. To prove Theorem 2, we propose a multi-party variation of INTERPOL, presented in Section V, which divides the task of polynomial evaluation into n parallel tasks, each performed by one user and verified by the remaining users, following a similar approach to the user-server setup.
Remark 5. In the absence of trust, a naive (but common) approach is for each node in the network to individually compute f (x), which implies an overall complexity of O(kn).
By contrast, our approach only requires O( k n ) computation per node, or O(k) computation overall. 2 Given that O(k) computation is needed for evaluating an arbitrary polynomial of degree k, we can observe that our algorithm is order-wise as efficient as in a trusted setup. Remark 6. Our multi-party algorithm can be directly applied to a blockchain network, where all the full nodes wish to verify the validity of a newly mined block of transactions. Without loss of generality, one can model this process as a polynomial evaluation task [9] . As the length of the distributed ledger increases, this process grows in complexity. Our multi-party algorithm proposes a natural solution to this problem. Instead of individually validating the blocks, nodes in the network divide the task of polynomial evaluation among themselves. Subsequently, each node carries out a small amount of computation in order to validate the results provided by the other nodes. If it is detected that a node has provided false results, other nodes can simply redo the computation and prohibit the malicious node from participating in the following rounds.
A. Comparison with Prior Works
The problem of verifiable computation has a rich history. Here, we suffice to address the works which are more prominent or closely related to our contribution. One of the first noninteractive verifiable computation algorithms was proposed in [1] . The authors observe that Yao's Garbled circuit [11] which was originally designed for two-party secure computation, can also perform a one-time verifiable computation of arbitrary functions. In order to make the circuit reusable, the authors encode the inputs with Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). But due to this reliance on FHE, this algorithm is of limited practical interest. An alternative approach is proposed in [4] , where the authors represent an arbitrary C code as an arithmetic circuit, which is then converted into a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP) [5] . The proof is generated by evaluating the QAP at a secret value "in the exponent".
We will now describe in more details some of the algorithms which are specifically designed for polynomial evaluation. In [2] the authors present one of the first efficient verifiable polynomial evaluation algorithms. Put simply, the server is provided with two vectors [a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ] and [g ca0+r0 , . . . , g ca k−1 +r k−1 ] where g is a generator of the field and [r 0 , . . . , r k−1 ] is a pseudorandom sequence which satisfies the closed form efficiency property. This property implies that the user can compute r(x) = r 0 + r 1 x + · · · + r k−1 x k−1 in sublinear time in k. Subsequently, once the server returns both f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a k−1 x k−1 , and h(x) = g ca0+r0+(ca1+r1)x+···+(ca k−1 +r k−1 )x k−1 the user can easily check whether h(x) = g cf (x)+r(x) . The complexity of the user under this assumption is O(log(k)). A variation of this algorithm is discussed in [7] which enables public verification.
The authors in [6] suggest that the user starts by generating a polynomial b(
over the field. The user then divides f (x) by g(x) to find the quotient q(x) = q 0 + q 1 x + · · · + q k−3 x k−3 and the remainder r(x) = r 0 + r 1 x such that f (x) = b(x)q(x) + r(x).
The server is provided with the two vectors [a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ] and [g q0 , . . . , g q k−3 ] and is asked to compute f (x) and g q(x) . Upon receiving these two values, the user can check whether g f (x) = (g q(x) ) b(x) g r(x) in constant time. This algorithm is also publicly verifiable. By comparison to the works mentioned above, INTERPOL stands out in that it is information-theoretic and relies on no cryptographic assumption. The verification time of
where k is the degree of the polynomial. Despite being significantly more efficient than performing the original computation, INTERPOL has the disadvantage of being slower than the existing cryptographic works which are specifically tailored to polynomial evaluation and typically run in log(k) or even constant time. We will now show how to accomplish this.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF INTERPOL
Consider a general problem of verifiable matrix-vector multiplication. Suppose the user intends to find ∆z where ∆ is a square s × s matrix and z is a column vector. The user starts by choosing a constant c > 0. As we will see soon, a larger c implies a higher complexity for the user, but results in an enhanced security. The user generates a random c × s matrix Λ of uniform i.i.d. elements over the field. The user then performs a one-time computation of Γ = Λ∆.
Note that this requires O(cs 2 ) computation. This may seem substantial at first, but one should note that this cost will be amortized, since the user does not need to update Γ for every input vector z.
The user keeps Λ and Γ as secret. He simply reveals ∆ and z to the server and asks him to compute w = ∆z. After receivingŵ from the server, the user checks whether Λŵ = Γz. Note that both Λŵ and Γz can be computed in O(cs) which is sublinear in the complexity of computing ∆z directly.
If the equality Λŵ = Γz holds, the user acceptsŵ as the result of ∆z. Otherwise, an error is declared and the verification process fails. This process has been summarized in Algorithm 1. In order to prove Theorem 1, we propose the following lemma, the proof of which can be found in [10] . Reveal x = x i to the server. 6: Ask server to compute w = ∆ 1 x . . . x s−1 .
7:
Receiveŵ from server. Similar to the user-server setup, we define ∆ as the s × s matrix where a i,j = a i×s+j . Furthermore, we define ∆ j as the submatrix of ∆ which consists of rows { s(j−1) n , . . . , sj n − 1}. The algorithm works as follows. Each node generates a set of n − 1 random matrices Λ ,j ∈ F c× s n q and performs a one-time computation of Γ ,j = Λ ,j ∆ j , j ∈ [n]\{ }. At each round of the algorithm, each node j will be in charge of computing w j = ∆ j 1 x . . . x s−1 which can be done in O( s 2 n ). The result of these computations are broadcast to the network. Once node receivesŵ [n]\{ } , he verifies the correctness of each computation by checking whether Γ ,j 1 x . . . x s−1 = Λ ,jŵj . Each of these verifications can be done in O( cs n ). Finally, assuming that all the verifications pass, node recovers f (x) = 1 x s . . . x s(s−1) ŵ T 1 . . .ŵ T n T . The overall complexity of this algorithm is O( s 2 n + csn + s) per node where the first term is the complexity of computing ∆ 1 x . . . x s−1 (as server), the second term is the complexity of performing the n − 1 verifications and the last term is the complexity of recovering f (x). Compared to a naive algorithm where each node individually computes f (x), this algorithm is n times faster, assuming that the number of nodes in the network is substantially smaller than s. This procedure has been summarized in Algorithm 2 in [10] . The performance of this algorithm is characterized in the next lemma which can be proven similarly to Lemma 1. Theorem 2 follows immediately. A. Enabling Error Correction in the Multi-party Setting As suggested in Section III, in the multi-party setting the network can dynamically remove the malicious nodes and repeat the computation that was assigned to them. An alternative approach to redoing the computation is to use erasure coding. Specifically, we can divide the matrix ∆ into k horizontal submatrices, and apply an (n, k) Reed-Solomon code to these submatrices to obtain {∆ 1 ,∆ 2 , . . . ,∆ n }. We can then assign the task of computing∆ 1 x . . . x s−1 to node . This approach increases the overall complexity of each node by a factor of n k . However, in the presence of up to n−k malicious nodes, each node can recover all∆ 1 x . . . x s−1 efficiently, thanks to the fast-decodability of RS codes. To appreciate the role of INTERPOL, note that in the absence of a verification mechanism, the same algorithm would only tolerate n−k+1 2 −1 errors (albeit deterministically). With the help of INTERPOL, we can locate the errors, thereby increase the tolerance against malicious users by a factor of 2.
